Equality in American History: Panel Discussion by Hexter, Jack
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1979 
Issue 1 Symposium: The Quest for Equality 
January 1979 
Equality in American History: Panel Discussion 
Jack Hexter 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jack Hexter, Equality in American History: Panel Discussion, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 051 (1979). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
PANEL DISCUSSION
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham. Jr., * the first panelist, presented some
a3pects of blacks in America from his published and ongoing historical
writin g.t
The following excerpt captures the flavor of the comments of Professor
Jack Hexter.* *
Equality has a peculiar status, as far as I can see, in the history of west-
ern man. The reality has always been of gross inequalities. That is part
of the story of western man-gross inequalities of opportunity and, par-
ticularly, gross inequalities of results. And yet, there is something in the
idea of equality of results that has an extraordinary attraction for men in
the West. There is a sense that people are sufficiently alike so that every-
body really ought to get the same or fair share. Somehow things such as
status, honor, character, appearance, physical power and prowess, beauty,
and brains did not get equally distributed. There is no way of saying that
there is anything fair about this distribution. There is something odd
about it rather than fair about it. Nobody who is born with brains, born
with beauty, born with good parents, or born with wealth "earned" to be
born that way. That little creature trying to catch his first breath did not
"earn" to have rich parents or poor parents, wise or unwise parents; did
not 'earn" to be bright or stupid. Somehow or other nature has never
provided fairness in the sense of equality of results for mankind.
But there is a sense that it is not just that this should be so-that results
should be so unequally distributed among mankind. Thus, on the side of
ideas, the burden of proof for why things should be distributed un-
equally-why talents should be distributed unequally, why opportunities
should be distributed unequally-tends to fall upon those who accept in
one way or another and benefit from the unequal distribution of those
things. It falls on those who argue that inequality should not be altered to
give the unfortunate a fair or a fairer shake, or a fairer share of life's
bounty.
Now, Professor Handlin's most compact and interesting talk told about
a slow, sometimes miserably slow, activity in the United States that did
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begin in some ways to level out some of those inequalities that were in-
herent in genetic endowment and in the social institutions of the society
brought from the old world. The process really was that of slowly getting
rid of the most outrageous and conspicuous of those inequalities, those
obstacles to equalizing results-titles of honor, heredity, privilege, dis-
crimination against people for their religion or for their national origins
or for their cultures. These steps as they were taken, according to Mr.
Handlin, increased equality of opportunity, but they did, in fact, have the
effect of giving greater equality of results. In fact, more people were
bound to get some of the good of this life. Now, all those things were
achieved, as Professor Handlin said, by negative actions.
But it is not quite true to say that Americans have been willing to stop
with negative action. Those actions did not require redistribution of
goods, but nevertheless, in American society there has been and there is
an increasing willingness to accept redistribution in favor of deeply un-
derprivileged classes. The most conspicuous case is the willingness to
bring about some redistribution for the benefit of the physically and men-
tally handicapped. In effect, society is required to bear a charge, to do
something for those who were naturally deprived of vision, of hearing,
and, nowadays, of capacity to move about. Society has been increasingly
willing to accept and to bear some redistributive charge in order to even
out to some degree the gross inequalities that are imposed upon people by
physical and, in some measure, mental handicaps.
There has appeared recently a very strong demand-a very positive de-
mand-saying there are people who are culturally and economically
handicapped. They are definable as deprived groups; either by law or by
social practice our society has so discriminated against these groups that
they have been deprived of the means to enter into what is called the
mainstream of society. And further inference has been made that this
deprivation is so profound that it cannot be balanced except by some re-
distributive process. And at that point one comes up against the problem
of the willingness of those whose goods are going to be redistributed to
accept redistribution.
After Judge Higginbotham commented about unequal starting points,
Professor Handin made thefollowing observation about the appropriate-
ness of shaping go vernmental policies to take account of that inequity:
The point that requires most thought is that which Judge Higginbot-
ham phrased in terms of the question whether it is not more proper to call
this a quest for inequality than a quest for equality. One might say that
these are just two sides of the same coin-that inequality is the other side
of equality. And one might ask what difference it makes in terms of
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which direction we discuss. I think it does make a difference; and it is
here that I part company with him.
I put the issue to him this way. Let us use as our reference point what I
think was the most difficult and most tragic phase in the history of group
relations in this country: the period that extended roughly from 1850 to
1930 or so. Now, everything Judge Higginbotham said about that period
is true and if I had time, I could expand indefinitely the roster of inci-
dents involving bad judgment-bad in law, as Justice Curtis pointed in
his minority opinion, and bad in history as well. But I ask not why these
dramatic injustices went as far as they did, but why they did not go far-
ther? In the 1880's not only did a majority listen to and approve of the
kind of views that President Cleveland expressed, but in addition, a firm
substratum of ideas justified racism in its most acute sense. Why did we
not have the laws to implement racism or apartheid? That question
brings us to the kinds of comparisons that are germane to the issue. Why
was it necessary even in as treacherous a case as Plessy-a bad case,
which I am happy was reversed-to add "but equal"? However the
phrase would be applied in practice, the judges had to add it. They did so
because even in that horrible period the judges, legislators, and ordinary
people who were racists were nonetheless so bound by that fundamental
precept of the Constitution that they could not deny equality without de-
nying their whole heritage. They dealt with persons and, therefore, dealt
with equals; and they could not legislate about groups within this consti-
tutional frame. Nor can we.
I condemn those slave advertisements as he does, although I would re-
mind him that the same columns sometimes carried similar advertise-
ments about white servants. But what is the direction in which this
country has been moving, however slowly, however imperfectly? I sug-
gest that it is a direction dictated by the founding assumptions of this
country-that the kind of people who are brought together in it will be
equal in law and later in opportunity.
Finally, I want to make one point that was suggested by Professor Hex-
ter's statement, one with which I did not deal-perhaps I should have, but
it would have taken a lot more time than I had and maybe a lot more
thought than that of which I am capable at the moment. How do we
decide what is fair or what is just when it comes to dealing with the real
inequalities of life? I do not mean inequalities associated with group
membership-because I think that is a temporary aspect of our existence,
which in twenty or thirty years may be far less important than it is
now-but real inequalities that do exist in talents, physical endowment,
and the like. In these matters I believe universal formulae are hazardous.
I give you an extreme case. Suppose a number of people all want to be
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neurosurgeons and the facilities for training neurosurgeons are very lim-
ited. How do we decide among the competing applicants for that limited
opportunity? I suggest that the appropriate standard of decision is not the
right of the prospective neurosurgeon, but the rights of future patients.
Justice in that case requires a judgment about what would best serve the
people who will require neurosurgery ten years hence--of whatever back-
ground, wealth, or degree of familiarity with the health care system those
patients may have.
At the opposite extreme are a whole range of callings in our society in
which the exercise of the client's interests will be equally served by wide
gradations of skills. It is more possible to take account of the demands of
competing people for entry into those fields. Hence, it is perfectly legiti-
mate to separate what happens in the building trade from what happens
in the medical schools. I do not mean this in any elitist sense; but it sim-
ply is a fact that the range of skills that goes into being a good bricklayer
or a good carpenter is not the same as that which goes into being a good
neurosurgeon. I fly home tonight. I do not care who is going to be a
stewardess on my plane. But I want to be sure there is a good pilot,
whatever his color or ethnic background may be. One of the conse-
quences of administrative judicial reordering in our society is the elimina-
tion of those distinctions: the executive order that is appropriate to the
building trades gets pushed to an extreme when it is transposed to alto-
gether different realms.
I conclude with the statement that the dream of freedom and equality is
one we must all share in this society because our society simply is not
viable in any other terms. We must not be diverted by immediate issues
into kinds of irrevocable judgments that will haunt us in the future.
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